READING TYPOS, READING ARCHIVES Steven Mailloux
rchivists with an Attitude" sounds like a complaint to an old-style historian and like a redundancy to a newfangled theorist. A complaint to the historian because archivists don't have attitudes, they have methods, and copping an attitude is inappropriate for any disciplined researcher. A redundancy to the theorist because being an archival researcher is an attitude, perhaps a problematic one but nonetheless an acknowledged practice within an intellectual tradition, and taking an attitude goes with the territory--it's not an optional stance but a necessary condition. However, between the scolding historian and the trivializing theorist, straw men both, there are archivists with rhetorical attitudes toward history and theory and their interrelation. In what follows I will talk about one such "attitude": something I call rhetorical hermeneutics. The little history I tell is a rhetorical replay of a rather brief and hardly noted confrontation between two archival practices: scholarly editing and deconstructive reading. Doing this history allows me to make certain theoretical points about archival research and to do so from a rhetorical perspective. That is, I use rhetoric to practice theory by doing history (see Mailloux, Reception Histories).
To be more exact, I'm going to discuss the exciting topic of reading typos as an example of archival work. As I present it here, reading typos is a practice within textual scholarship, the material and interpretive history of textual documents, which is a rather venerable if now somewhat overshadowed tradition of humanistic research and pedagogy. I begin with two examples of typo reading and then quickly pass on My first example of typo reading is among the most famous in editing lore: E O.
Matthiessen's 1941 tour de force in the American Renaissance. In his interpretation of White Jacket, Matthiessen praises Melville for his surprising trope, a "soiled fish of the sea," and claims that "its unexpected linking of the medium of cleanliness (water) with filth (soiled) could only have sprung from an imagination that had apprehended the terrors of the deep, of the immaterial deep as well as the physical" (392). As many of you know, Matthiessen makes a rather egregious scholarly error here, for he carelessly reads a typo for the truth. Melville almost certainly wrote "coiled fish"; this is what appeared in the first edition, and it was some unknown compositor who miscopied this as "soiled fish" for a later reprint of White Jacket. Matthiessen's archival negligence in relying on a popular reprint edition has often been used by textual scholars as a warning to would-be interpreters who ignore the textual history of the version they are using in their critical studies. Note that the Matthiessen passage ends with a distinctive binary: "the immaterial" versus "the physical," a figurative opposition that is more generally important to archival research, as I will attempt to show. It seems unlikely that de Man meant to say "Is the status of a text line the status of a statue?", for a "text line" would seem to mean a unit or building block of a text and would therefore not be parallel with "statue," a whole work. The matter must remain uncertain, however-as indeed, the constitution of all texts of works is uncertain. (31 n. 16) In this qualified way, Tanselle proposes amending "line" to "like." Later, I will return to this proposal and the theoretical argument of which it forms a part, but for now I wish to build on the next sentence in Tanselle's footnote: "This typographical error, if it is that, illustrates the necessity for deciding on the makeup of the text as a part of the act of reading."
Tanselle's claim nicely fits a general argument I want to make about textual editing as the paradigm for critical and historical interpretation. If "deciding on the makeup of the text" is an unavoidable act within every reading, then can we not say that a kind of editing takes place-by omission or commission-in every textual interpretation? It has always been a mistake, I think, for textual scholars-including those who cite the Matthiessen typo reading-to argue merely that r ing is a necessary preliminary to sound criticism. Rather, it would be editing is criticism and history, both in the sense that editing is an Moby-Dick do not refer to a thing, an object, but rather to a class of ob that "a Work is in important ways both plural and fragmented" ( could go even further in rejecting Tanselle's idealism and agree w
McGann, who has said that "far from representing an 'alien' condition it seems to me that 'the physical' (whether oral or written) is their on (qtd. in Greetham 9 n. 14).
Be that as it may, Tanselle attempts to support his material-text/ide tinction by a related one: the difference between verbal works, like li criticism, and physical works, like painting and statues. Unlike verbal are material entities in which material texts and immaterial works occ space, according to . I realize that this diff right at first hearing, but it is just as problematic as the text/work dist have to do is start noting examples of etchings or bronze statues prod ple versions. But even if we talk about single paintings or statues, diffe and place make for differences in works, that is, differences in inter experiences of these artifacts. I see no qualitative difference between or book existing in one copy and a statue existing in one copy. All hav preted and experienced by readers/observers. "Is the status of a text l of a statue?" Yes, sometimes it is.
Which brings me back to reading the de Man typo. In his commen selle's essay, D. C. Greetham argues for the reading "text line" over "t rather, he rereads Tanselle's reading as "humorous" and then carries on vein. He writes that Tanselle's footnote on the emendation of "like" fo Tanselle's decision to amend the de Manian text any less determinate than placing a statue in a museum and calling it "the work"? He seems to claim as much when he says that the correctness of his proposed emendation of "line" to "like" "must remain uncertain, however-as, indeed, the constitution of all texts of works is uncertain" (31 n. 16).
I would suggest a different conclusion: "Certainty" is relative to rhetorical context. That is, certainty about the correctness of Tanselle's proposal depends on the argument made for the emendation proposed, the disciplinary protocols holding in the community in which the argument happens, and a host of other rhetorical fac- Cain, William E., ed. Reconceptualizing American Literary/Cultural Stud History, and Politics in the Humanities. New York: Garland P, 1996.
